Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia

Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia & Afghanistan
by Dr. Robert F. Baumann

DESCRIPTION:

In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in Caucasus, Central Asia & Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars.
Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars. Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801-59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839-81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918-33), and the Soviet war in
Afghanistan (1979--89). The history of these wars-especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them-offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. "This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.
In particular, these cases illustrate the problems commonly confronted by conventional military powers when fighting unconventional foes in undeveloped theaters. Such problems include not only adjustment to the tactics of an unfamiliar enemy but the adaptation of one's own tactics and equipment to constraints imposed on them by terrain, climate, and distance. Political and economic considerations also played a central role and contributed to important shifts in Russian and Soviet strategic designs. Thus, a common thread running through each of these studies is the challenge armies face in conceptualizing and implementing changes after combat operations have begun.
Finally, Dr. Baumann considers broad patterns of conduct apparent in these wars and even compares them with the American experience in similar conflicts. This study will be of broad interest to military professionals and historians alike.