NVAinLAOS.pdf

Laos was designed to be a buffer state between Thailand and North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese, however, were determined to influence if not actually control events in the country. In response, the United States and Thailand backed various right-wing elements and selected tribal groups (principally the Meo) to frustrate North Vietnamese designs and to establish Western centers of
influence where feasible.

Though initially constrained by weather and poor roads, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) began a pattern of ebb and flow, expanding military activity in Laos in response to political setbacks in Vientiane, pulling back when their clients, the Pathet Lao, did well. Gradually, the NVA policy evolved from one of bolstering the position of their buffer allies to one of maintaining total domination over large areas of Laos to protect the Ho Chi Mitih Trail. Thus, from 1965 onward, the North Vietnamese viewed Laos not only as a buffer but as
the corridor through which their lifeline to the south must pass. Eventually, Laos became one more battlefield in the Indochina War as the NVA launched multi- division operations while the United States flew up to 700 sorties per day in
Laos, and Thai infantry and artillery battalions assisted the CIA-supported Meo Irregulars and the Royal Lao Army.

Following collapse of the French military position in Indochina in 1954, the level of military activity in Laos remained low until the end of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's coalition government in 1958. The. United States encouraged
right-wing reaction in the Wake of Pathet Lao electoral gains followed bv the neutralist coup of Kong Le left the Lao political scene fragmented in Rightest, Neutralist, and Pathet Lao factions. When it became apparent that the right-wing forces under Phoumi Nosavan would never prevail, U.S. policy shifted behind Souvanna Phouma's neutralist position and, in the wake of the Geneva Convention, another coalition government was formed. However, polarization again ensued in
early 1963 when the CIA organized a Meo offensive which hill-hopped to within 15 kilometers of Sam Neua City and Pathet Lao forces, with NVA backing, attempted to drive Kong Le's neutralist forces from the Tlain of Jars. The CIA rsponded to Kong Le's plight by ordering Vang Pao's Meo to support his forces. The NVA then reacted with a series of Dry Season offensives to clear the Meo positions from the dominating terrain along Route 6, leading to the Plain of Jars. By 1969, the NVA had achieved their objective and had improved their lines of communication to a point where they were subsequently able to contest Vang Pao for the Plain with multi-division offensives by 1970-71. By 1973, the Meo had
lost the Plain of Jars and had only one remaining major base at Long Tieng.